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“The Matrix is a computer-generated dreamworld built to keep us under 
control” Morpheus, early in The Matrix. 
 
“ In dreaming, you are not only out of control, you don’t even know it…I 
was completely duped again and again the minute my pons, my amygdala, 
my perihippocampal cortex, my anterior cingulate, my visual association 
and parietal opercular cortices were revved up and my dorsolateral 





The Matrix is an exercise in ambivalence, and at the very heart of that 
ambivalence lies the Dream.  
 
In our dreams, we are not in control. Real dreaming, unlike many 
popular philosophers’ fictions, is an altered state, closely related to 
the states induced by chemical manipulations such as the use of 
(certain) medical or recreational drugs. The dreaming brain is not like 
the wakeful brain. Normal sensory input is blocked, attentional 
capacities are impaired or lost, memory is distorted, reasoning and 
logic are weakened, narratives run wild, self-reflection is dampened 
or destroyed, emotion and instinct are hyperstimulated, and forms of 




It may seem as if all of this is simply a direct effect of the blockage of 
sensory input, but this is not so. Instead, profound changes in 
neurochemical activity also occur, and these in turn compromise 
what J. Allan Hobson calls our ‘critical self-awareness’. The result is 
that even though the goings-on in most dreams would cause us (were 
we awake) to suspect trickery or to question our sanity, in our 
dreams we simply accept them as normal, as real life! One way to 
keep people ‘under control’ as Morpheus put it, is to keep them (in 
this specific sense) out of (self) control.  One of the issues I want to 
explore is: to what extent are the experiences of normal matrix-bound 
humans (matrixers) genuinely dream-like, where to be genuinely 
dream-like is (in part) to display this dampening of critical acuity? I 
shall call this normal, critically compromised dream-state ‘uncritical 
dreaming’. 
 
But there is, of course, another image of dreaming, and this is the 
image that has so far received most attention in these essays. This is 
the view of dreaming that links up with Descartes’ famous ‘malicious 
demon’ thought experiments, and with standard philosophical 
discussions of what we can (and cannot) know. These explore the 
question, what can we really know on the basis of our actual 
experience? Dreaming, thus construed, is not really like dreaming at 
all: it is a state in which all the sensory experiences might be just as 
they are in waking, and our critical faculties as bright and active as 
ever. I shall call this kind of ‘dreaming’  ‘industrial strength ‘deception’, 
so as to distinguish it from real dreaming.  
 
The (apparent) deception practiced by the machines, we can now see, 
comes in two potential varieties. First, there is the industrial-strength 
version. Here all the sensory inputs that assail your brain are just as 
they would be were you living and moving in a world of persisting, 
external, independent people, cities, cars and objects, and you 
yourself are as alert and critical as ever. Second, there is the 
’uncritical dreaming’ version, where the flow of sensory images and 
data is actually not all as it should be3. Things may morph and 
change, scenes shift, identities alter. Here, weirdness may be rampant 
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yet generally unremarked, since your abilities to judge that all is not 
as it should be are fatally impaired, due to the critical-dampening 
effects of the neuro-chemical alterations distinctive of sleeping or 
drugging. The genius of the Matrix (I shall argue) is its ability to 
balance, both thematically and cinematically, on a knife-edge 
between these two versions of events.  
 
 
The industrial strength version invites an important response, ably 
advanced by David Chalmers in his paper on this site. According to 
this response, industrial strength ‘deception’ is not really deception at 
all! Matrixers subject to this kind of manipulation really do inhabit 
(so the argument goes) pretty much the world they believe 
themselves to inhabit. ‘Industrial strength matrixers’, as I shall call 
them, really do live in cities and roam a planet much like earth. Later 
in this essay I will further defend this view, arguing that (still 
assuming industrial strength ‘deception’) matrix-based human 
intelligences would count as being as fully and richly embodied as 
you and I. Despite those (other) bodies we see suspended in the 
machine-feeding womb, industrial strength matrixers really do use 
their head and eyes to scan the visual scene and their legs to move 
around. According to this view, the body in the Matrix is not a 
dreamt body, at least not in any ordinary sense of dreaming. It is a 
real body, realized in the non-standard medium of bits of 
information. With the point made for the visible body, the parallel 
result for the wider world (of cities, cars, sky and dust) may become a 
little easier to swallow.  
 
We can then return to the nature of dreaming. For part of the 
ambivalence at the heart of the Matrix is, I think, an abiding 
ambivalence about the nature of dreaming itself. Real dreaming, to 
repeat, involves profound changes to the cognitive system deployed 
in normal wakefulness, changes that systematically deprive us of 
much of our normal critical acuity.  In real dreaming, activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is compromised: ‘muffled’ in that 
opening quote from J. Allan Hobson, Director of the 
Neurophysiology Laboratory at Harvard medical school. 
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Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is (among other things) the ‘executive 
brain’ that helps us organize our thinking, critically assess our own 
gut responses and maintain at least a modicum of top-down control. 
The kind of state that Morpheus calls ‘ a computer-generated 
dreamworld’ hovers uneasily between such true (profoundly 
cognitive acuity diminishing) dream states and something much 
closer to unknowing-yet-fully-awake participation in a form of multi-
agent immersive virtual reality: an ‘interactive virtual environment’ 
as Morpheus also puts it. 
 
The moral ambiguity that permeates the Matrix is rooted in this same 
balancing act between real dreaming and a multi-agent immersive 
virtual reality in which the neural states of the average matrix 
dwellers are (courtesy of the machines) really identical to those of 
awake, active humans. Drift towards the former reading, according 
to which the matrix-dwellers’ cognitive states are neurologically akin 
to those critically diminished states distinctive of real human 
dreaming, and everything-ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING- changes. 
Not only does the previous argument for true embodiment in the 
matrix fail, but the moral status of the machines’ experiment is 
immediately and radically transformed. Instead of seeing the 
machines as maintaining a kind of innocent immersive virtual reality, 
wherein human embodiment and human intelligence is, in every way 
that matters, everything it always was, the ploy of the machines 
becomes more like that of pimps who keep their call-girls hooked on 
heroin. Thus cognitively diminished, the girls do not question their 
state, and are not able to plot a rebellion or plan an escape.  
 
Drug-forcing pimps or master immersive reality programmers? It is 
by maintaining a studied ambivalence between these two readings 
that (I claim) the Matrix film sequence gains much of its power, its 
beauty and its profound ability to puzzle. 
 
2. Real Dreaming (Asleep in the Matrix) 
 
Neo believes, under the influence of Morpheus and of his own 
experiments, that matrix-bound humanity is in the grip of a 
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delusional dream. In the dream, the apparently sensed world seems 
real. It seems like a place where the body moves, where the eyes 
roam, where flesh meets flesh and sometimes lead and steel. But this, 
Neo comes to believe, is simply a dream, a device to keep us quiet 
while the machines patiently suck energy from the preserved 
slumbering bio-mass. To prove that it is a dream, Neo learns to 
subvert its logic: he becomes able to turn back bullets, to fly, to defeat 
agents, and all this because he wills it to be so. 
 
In one important sense, however, this is no ordinary dream. For in 
this dream (as Neo understands it) there is real contact between 
multiple intelligences. When Neo speaks to Cypher, he does not 
speak merely to a construct of his own sleep-bound imagination, but 
to another sentient being, with genuinely independent memories, 
hopes, fears and skills. Moreover, these multiple intelligences can 
communally build persisting structures in their world. They can 
build worlds to live and act in. If Neo places a cup on a table in a 
certain room, it will be seen by Cypher when Cypher enters that 
room (unless someone else moves it away first). A simple bio-mass of 
individually dreaming humans could never achieve and maintain 
this kind of interpersonal and structural continuity and integration. 
So the machines must be doing something (a whole lot in fact) to 
keep things in line.  
 
Nonetheless, there is clearly something dream-like going on, for only 
in a world not fully bound by the laws of (even simulated) earthly 
physics could Neo fly, or turn back those bullets. In a normal Virtual 
Reality simulation, you cannot bend the rules just by willing it. By the 
same token, video-gaming would be a whole different sport were the 
underlying code directly susceptible to the will of the players! 
Moreover, the movie is chock-full of images that morph and shift in 
ways not seen in waking life, again suggesting that this is not a 
perfect simulation of earthly physics, but something less stable, 
lacking in firewalls, and prone to direct subversion by the minds of 
enlightened matrixers. The average matrixer, of course, does not 
subvert, remains unenlightened, and seems to be almost 
sleepwalking through a mundane, yet not unpleasant, life. This 
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contrast is perhaps most striking in the scene at the end of the first 
movie, where Neo, increasingly enlightened, steps out of the ‘phone 
box to see hordes of ignorant matrixers moving in trance-like, 
clockwork fashion, their images somewhat out of focus in a classic 
depth of field manipulation, while that of Neo is crystal-clear, alert, 
and bemused by their unquestioning, anesthetized progress through 
the world.  
 
To try to clarify just what we are dealing with, it will help to first take 
a hard look at normal human dreaming. Then we can begin to plot 
some differences and to explore the space of options. A word of 
warning though. Familiar as they are, sleep and dreaming are 
complex, ill-understood phenomena.  The sketch that follows is 
widely accepted and heavily rooted in the best contemporary 
neuroscience and psychopharmacology. But it is not written in stone, 
and much remains unclear. 
 
The three dominant states for the human brain are waking, REM 
(Rapid Eye Movement) Sleep, and non-REM (NREM) sleep. Each 
state has clear physiological, pharmacological and experiential 
correlates.  
 
In waking, we can occupy many states, from eyes-closed imagistic 
musing to eyes-open, alert engagement with a potentially threatening 
environment. The option of alertness and full critical engagement is, 
however, typically present, even if we are engaged momentarily in 
detached daydreaming. 
 
In REM sleep our dreams (at least as evidenced by subsequent 
report) are vivid, but their logic is weak. Here is a typical enough 
report: 
 
I was at a conference and trying to get breakfast but the food 
and the people in line kept changing. My legs didn’t work 
properly and I found it a great effort to hold my tray up. Then I 
realized why. My body was rotting away and liquid was 
oozing from it. I thought I might be completely rotted before 
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the end of the day, but I thought I should still get some coffee if 
I still had the strength. 
 
 Excerpt quoted in Blackmore (2004) p.340 
 
Here is another description, this time from Helena Bonham-Carter, 
while she was expecting a baby with movie director Tim Burton: 
 
“I dreamed I gave birth to a frozen chicken. In my dream, I was 
very pleased with a frozen chicken”  
 
Quoted by Lynn Hirschberg (2003)  
 
In NREM sleep, if we dream at all, the dreams (again, as evidenced 
by waking report) are more like faint and mundane thoughts or 
fuzzy rememberings. 
 
All these states (waking, REM-sleep, NREM sleep) are correlated 
with specific patterns of neuro-chemical activity. A useful tool for 
displaying the pattern is Hobson’s AIM model. Hobson is a leading 
sleep researcher interested in the relation between waking, sleeping 
and the kinds of altered state experienced during psychosis and 
drug-use. The AIM model characterizes different states as points in a 
three dimensional space, whose axes are: 
 
1. Activation Energy  
2. Input Source 
3. Mode 
 
Normal wakefulness is characterized by high activation (as measured 
by EEG for example) corresponding to fairly intense experience, 
external input sources (the brain is receiving and processing a rich 
stream of sensory signals from the world, rather than being shut 
down and largely re-cycling its own activity), and a distinctive mode. 
Mode here names a balance between brain chemicals, especially 
amines and cholines. Amines are neurotransmitters such as 
noradrenaline and serotonin, whose action is known to be essential 
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for normal waking consciousness (they are essential to the processes 
that enable us direct attention, reason things through, and decide to 
act). When these are shut off, and other neurotransmitters (cholines, 
such as acetylcholine) dominate, we experience delusions and 
hallucinations (if we are awake) and vivid, uncritical dreaming (if we 
are asleep). In this way it is the amine/choline balance that 
determines how signals and information (whether externally or 
internally generated) will be dealt with and processed. When the 
balance (as in waking) favors the amine-based (aminergic) system, 
we are rational, alert to our surroundings, easily able to direct our 
own actions and to rapidly and critically appraise our situation. 
When the balance favors the cholinergic system, our focus shifts 
inwards, emotion and analogical reasoning begin to dominate, and 
critical control and judgment wane. In REM sleep, the aminergic 
systems are totally deactivated and the cholinergic hyperactive. This 
is an extremely altered cognitive state. Only extreme forms of 
psychosis or serious medical or recreational drug use can induce this 
kind of state in non-sleeping humans. In normal waking states, the 
ratio of aminergic to cholinergic activity varies across a large 
continuum. In non-REM sleep, all the systems (aminergic and 
cholinergic alike) are dampened and (mostly) inactive4. 
 
This is not to suggest (far from it) that the best state for a human 
mind would be one of almost-complete aminergic dominance. 
Instead, the power, subtlety and beauty of wakeful human 
intelligence seems to have much to do with the precise details of the 
ever-shifting balance between the two systems. But in normal waking 
the mode (defined as the ratio between the activity of the two 
systems) leans towards the aminergic. Whereas in REM sleep, with 
acetycholine dominating, experience becomes increasingly 
dissociative, displaying “amnesia, hallucinations,bizarre mentation, 
anxiety,and loss of volition control” (Hobson, p. 91). All this, we now 
know, is matched by a shift in regional blood flow from (in waking) 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex  to (in REM sleep) subcortical limbic 
structures (some of which are mentioned in the opening quote). Here 
too, the psychological and the physiological march (unsurprisingly, 
surely) in step, with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex implicated in 
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analytic reason, inhibition and executive control, and the limbic 
structures dominating for emotion, instinct and association5.  
 
Bottom line: The kind of sleep in which we experience vivid 
dreaming is, typically at least, a state in which aminergic systems 
essential to critical reason are deactivated. This state is a far cry from 
normal wakefulness. The reason we (often) don’t know we are 
dreaming is not because the dream simulates waking reality (the 
immersive Virtual Reality option) but because we are cognitively 
diminished in ways that block voluntary attention and critical 
engagement and that promote a kind of face-value acceptance. In 
REM sleep we are, in a real sense, drugged witless by our own brains. 
And the cure, as Hobson and Neo would probably both agree, is 
simple: it is called waking up!  
 
Is it possible that the machines are electrically or chemically altering 
the states of the brains of their human power-cells, so as to partially 
or totally deactivate the aminergic system and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex? To compromise these would be to compromise the 
matrixers capacities for critical engagement and analysis in a very 
profound way.  Certainly, we sometimes see images of the humans 
suspended within the machine’s grid in what seem to be advanced 
stages of REM sleep. If this is what is going on, those human brains 
are, in a fairly precise sense, permanently drugged. What Neo has 
achieved is then well compared (as other essayists have noted) to the 
state known as lucid dreaming. In lucid dreaming, a very few 
subjects are able to become aware that they are dreaming, without 
actually awakening. They may even be able to take control of the 
dream itself, forcing in directions previously requested by an 
experimenter or simply for their own enjoyment.  
 
The full AIM (Activation/Input/Mode) profile of the lucid dreamer 
is still unclear, but Hobson speculatively suggests that one key may 
be a kind of prior-to-sleep priming in which the lucid dreamer 
prepares to recognize the delusional REM dream state as it develops. 
REM sleep actually enhances priming effects, in which (for example) 
prior exposure to one word makes recall of another quicker or more 
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likely. Pre-sleep preparations may, Hobson suggests, prime6 a more 
complex association between the signature (fuzzy, delusional) 
character of REM sleep and the realization that you are indeed 
sleeping. A kind of positive feedback cycle can then take root, so that 
the primed realization of dreaming is fed by each encounter with 
new unlikely or delusional elements. At this point the mode balance 
may shift a little, so that some dorsolateral prefrontal involvement 
becomes possible. Not too much, or the vivid dream state would be 
lost. Not too little, or control would be lost and dreamt delusions 
would (as usual) be taken as real. This is a testable hypothesis, using 
PET neuroimaging to reveal fluctuations in neural regional blood 
flow during lucid dreaming. But it has not yet been tested.  
 
Might Neo have been somehow primed, before the machine-induced 
sleep, in this kind of way? Or perhaps, by some kind of neuro-
chemical accident, Neo, Morpheus and a few others are simply 
immune to the suppression of their aminergic systems? The Matrix as 
uncritical dream, and Neo as lucid dreamer. Such views at first seem 
to make good sense. But only if we assume that the state of the 
typical matrixer is indeed a real dream state. Such a reading, it 
should now be clear, is problematic for a number of reasons. For one 
thing, there is strong narrative continuity (major plot items do not 
just come and go without explanation). There is also good 
interpersonal agreement (what Neo does, Trinity sees, and so on). But 
most obviously of all, the typical matrixer simply does not seem to be 
unusually uncritical. For sure, they are not constantly reflecting on 
their life and analyzing its worth. But, and this is crucial, within the 
movie truly unusual happenings are indeed usually spotted as such. The 
security guards are as amazed as we are when Neo and Trinity, 
armed to the teeth, burst through the gates. When Neo stops bullets, 
or flies, the typical matrixer is astounded. This is not the reaction of 
an uncritical dreamer.  
 
Colin McGinn, in his paper on this site, is at pains to highlight the 
many layers of dream-like quality that permeate the movie, and to 
depict Neo as a lucid dreamer. But in the chemically and cognitively 
precise sense just outlined, life in the Matrix is simply not like life in a 
 10
dream, and Neo is nothing like a lucid dreamer. The typical matrixer 
does not display the full cognitive signature of uncritical dreaming, 
and it therefore seems unlikely that the machines are actively 
maintaining the brains of their human power cells in the standard 
(aminergic-off, hyper-cholinergic) REM-sleep mode. Whatever else 
the machines may be doing, they do not seem to be acting merely like 
drug-pushing pimps. It is not that Neo is special because he has his 
wits available, but rather, because he is beginning to really use them 
and to question (guided by Morpheus) so much that he previously 
took for granted.  
 
In section 4, I’ll consider a midway option in which elements of real 
dreaming combine with elements of immersive simulation. For the 
moment, however, we are again face to face with the productive 
tension at the very heart of the Matrix. For McGinn is surely right, 
despite all this, to remark the genuinely dream-like, shifting and 
sometimes disconnected visual and dramatic qualities that repeatedly 
surface. The point I now want to make, and will return to at the end, 
is that this tension is distinctive of our normal waking life as well! For 
our waking experience is itself the product of that constantly shifting 
balance between the aminergic and cholinergic systems, a balance 
that alters and evolves minute-by-minute during any normal day. As 
Hobson puts it “it is as if we are designed to be rational (but cool) 
and irrational (but hot) by turns” (p.97).  The Matrix film sequence, 
by repeatedly shifting between narrative and visual modes proper to 
critically engaged waking reality and then to delusional sleep, is able 
to explore the whole spectrum of positions in Hobson’s AIM three-
space. In so doing it gives us insight into the inherently unstable 
nature of human awareness itself. 
 
3. Industrial Strength ‘Deception’ (Awake in the Matrix). 
 
In real dreaming, we often believe ourselves to be in places we are 
not, doing things we are not. On the face of it, life in the Matrix is an 
endless dream. According to this very natural view, most humans in 
the matrix are doubly deceived. They are deceived about their 
physical surroundings, believing themselves to live in cities and to 
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roam the Earth, when “in fact” they are suspended in an energy-
sucking machine-made womb. They are also (still on the face of it) 
deceived about their own bodies, believing themselves to be moving 
their limbs, flexing their muscles, and scanning the scene with their 
eyes and heads, when “in fact” their bodies are still, their heads are 
fixed, their eyes closed. Such, at least, is the dominant interpretation 
of the true state of Matrix-based humanity.  
 
But there is an alternative. To bring it into view, we need to imagine 
that the machines are not simply guiding (and somehow, rather 
puzzlingly, making intersubjectively coherent) the real dreamings of 
the slumbering bio-mass. Instead, suppose that they have created a 
detailed simulation of the physics and structure of the normal human 
world, and that they are closely and continuously monitoring the 
neural activity in the brains of their human power cells. These brains 
are fed signals that correspond exactly to the ones they would receive 
were they awake and acting in the world, and the virtual world 
updated in ways that conform to those actions. Each day, these brains 
would go through just the same chemical cycles as normal human 
brains, moving systematically through Hobson’s AIM space: from 
awake  (aminergic systems highly active, so-called Sleep-On neurons 
inactive, critically alert) to N-REM sleep ( forebrain Sleep-On neurons 
fire7, aminergic and cholinergic systems inactive, more or less 
dreamless) to REM sleep (brain-stem REM-Sleep-On neurons fire, 
aminergic systems shut off, cholinergic systems highly active, vivid 
dreaming can occur, and critical and executive faculties extremely 
dulled).   
 
Do matrixers really dream and awaken, or do they only dream they 
are dreaming and awakening? In the industrial strength version, it 
seems more accurate to say they really dream and awaken. The states 
of their brains8 in matrix-sleep, on this version, differ from the states 
of their brains during matrix-waking in just the same ways as ours do 
between wake and sleep. By contrast if, in a real dream, we dream we 
fall asleep, there is no such neuro-chemical shift. So too, if (in a real 
dream) we dream we are awakening, that does not itself activate the 
dormant aminergic systems that would actually awaken us and 
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restore our critical acuity. Once again, the differences between the 
two versions are striking.  
 
The machines, on the industrial strength version I am now pursuing, 
create a detailed immersive virtual reality that is sensitive to the 
actions of all the users, and they ensure that my actions encounter 
obstacles and generate systematic sensory feedback exactly as they 
do in the normal world. That would include, for instance, generating 
the whole panoply of signals distinctive of muscle tiredness after an 
arduous rock climb, and those distinctive of hunger, and of the 
satiation of hunger by food (recall Cypher’s infamous steak), and so 
on. (Notice that on the real-dream version none of this is necessary: 
instead, Cypher only needs to believe he has enjoyed a steak. These 
are different states). 
 
On this industrial strength version, I claim, matrixers are genuinely 
embodied and are able to eat, act, wake, sleep and dream in a world 
that is every bit as real as they imagine (though its deep physics is, as 
David Chalmers in his essay on this site points out, not quite as they 
think).  
 
To make this stick (or even to make it begin to seem plausible) we can 
start by looking a bit harder at what it means to have a body, and at 
what having a body does for a mind like ours. With this 
understanding in place, it should be possible to see how the human 
intelligences in the industrial strength Matrix could be embodied 
intelligences through and through. They would be embodied not in 
virtue of those organic shells feeding the machines, but in virtue of 
the crucial role of eye-movements, head-movements, and limb-
movements in altering the inputs to their brains and nervous system, 
and in virtue of the way the world presents itself both as a resource 
for action and as a source of limits on action. 
 
Consider a fairly typical example of embodied action: solving a 
jigsaw puzzle. First, I arrange the pieces on the table in front of me, 
perhaps placing the predominantly red pieces (bits of an image of a 
rocket) in one pile, the green  (bits of an image of the jungle) in 
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another, the pieces with one straight edge in a third, and so on. To 
solve the puzzle, I then combine a variety of tactics. One tactic 
involves repeatedly looking from the pieces to the half-completed 
puzzle. During these periods, my eyes make repeated movements 
(known as saccades) that bring different aspects of the scene into 
foveal view. (Human vision depends heavily on moving a small high 
resolution are, known as the fovea, around the scene, so as to retrieve 
information as and when needed). Another tactic involves picking 
pieces up and trying them out, to see if they really fit in certain 
locations. Yet another tactic involves reasoning about the shape of the 
missing pieces: there must be one there with a wiggly edge and half 
red and half green. So I again scan the scene, with this image in mind, 
hoping to find such a piece.  
 
In this kind of problem solving, the body and world play important 
roles9. Instead of creating a full image of the half completed puzzle in 
my mind’s eye, and then looking over the pieces, I repeatedly shift 
gaze from the real puzzle to the pieces. This saves my brain from 
encoding (no doubt badly) all that complex detail. And when I have 
isolated a candidate piece, I make the final decision by actually trying 
it out for fit. At this point, the world may fight back, refusing to allow 
a piece to fit, however much I want it to. This is an example of what 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus10 call running up against a boundary condition 
in our attempts to cope with the world (I’ll return to Neo’s, and the 
agents’, abilities to bend such rules in a moment). Moreover, notice 
that I started out by organizing the workplace in a way that then 
helps reduce my problem-solving load (making the various piles). All 
this is what Cognitive Scientist David Kirsh calls ‘the intelligent use 
of space’. 
 
Now all of these ploys and strategies are available, quite 
straightforwardly, to the average industrial strength matrixer. She 
can use the external world (as constituted by the machines detailed 
and action-responsive simulation) to reduce the problem-solving 
load for her own cognitive processing. She can use body and eye 
movements so as to leave lots of important detail ‘in the world’, 
retrieving information as and when needed for a specific action. She 
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can intervene so as to organize the workspace in ways that then 
persist, independently of further cognitive efforts on her part, and 
that  (for example) save her searching for red pieces among the green 
by keeping all the red ones in a pile, and so on.  
 
Consider, finally, the sense of presence, of where we are. There is a 
wonderful thought-experiment due to the philosopher Daniel 
Dennett. Dennett tells the story of a U.S. citizen who agrees to 
participate in a secret experiment.  The citizen is Dennett himself, and 
in the experiment Dennett’s brain is removed, kept alive in a tank of 
nutrients, and equipped with a multitude of radio links by means of 
which to execute all its normal bodily control functions.  Dennett’s 
body (which is to be used to explore a dangerous area) is equipped 
with receivers and transmitters, so that it can use its in-built sensors 
(eyes, ears, etc.) to relay information back to Dennett’s brain.  As the 
technicians in the story put it11;  
 
“Think of it … as a mere stretching of the nerves.  If 
your brain were just moved over an inch in your 
skull, that would not alter or impair your mind.  
We’re simply going to make the nerves indefinitely 
elastic by splicing radio links into them.” 
 
There is a way of thinking of what the machines have done (in the 
industrial strength version) that is a lot like this. But instead of using 
the brain to control a standard body exploring distant and dangerous 
parts of the standard world, they have ‘stretched the nerves’ all the 
way into a fully immersive virtual reality, allowing the brain to 
control a kind of body-double avatar12.  
 
With his brain safely excised and re-located, and the radio links 
established, Dennett awakes.  He sees the nurse, who leads him to the 
room where his brain is being kept.  The experience that ensues is 
puzzling.  There is Dennett, standing up, staring at his own brain.  Or 
is he?  Perhaps, he muses, the proper thought is “here I am, 
suspended in a bubbly fluid, being stared at by my own eyes …” Try 
as he may, Dennett cannot seem to place himself in the tank.  It 
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continues to seem as if he is outside the tank, looking in.  Dennett’s 
point-of-view, as he moves, seems securely fixed outside the tank13.  
 
 
Where is Dennett?  Is he really in the tank of nutrient, really outside 
the tank looking in, or really no-place at all (or both places at once)?  
Such questions need have no clear-cut answers.  But what does seem 
clear is that human location should not be taken to be a function of 
facts about the location of the brain. After all, wherever ‘you’ are, it 
surely isn’t inside the top of your own head! Human presence, 
instead, is better understood as dependent upon our capacities for 
dense, closed loop control. By that I mean control (of some kind of body) 
such that as the body moves, the brain receives rich and detailed 
feedback. It is this kind of feedback cycle and closed loop control that 
supports skilful action. Skillful action then enables us, as the 
computer scientist Paul Dourish puts it, to engage in ‘inhabited 
interactions’.14 The difference between an inhabited and a non-
inhabited interaction is just the difference between, for example, 
having to carefully plan, monitor and execute a reach for a coffee cup, 
and ‘just reaching’, as we expert coffee-cup grabbers do. Inhabiting 
the body, we are able to fluently use movement and action as parts of 
our own problem-solving routines. 
 
Putting all this together, I can now offer a proposal for how to think 
about the body and the world: 
  
1. The body is a controllable and inhabitable resource. 
 
2. It is located (or its parts are located) in one or more co-ordinate 
spaces, and its actions (or the actions of its parts) evolve in time. 
 
3. Experiences of dense, closed loop control involving this 




4. It is a resource capable (via these ‘inhabited interactions’) of 
being skillfully used to transform a problem space, and to 
exploit properties and features of the world.  
 
5. The world is the place where such embodied actions encounter 





6. Real space is wherever perception and embodied action occur. 
 
 
Space, body and world are in this way all inter-defined. According to 
this formula, industrial strength deception is a contradiction in 
terms15. The world of the industrial strength matrixer is a real world. 
It acts as a boundary condition for skilled action, and it is populated 
by real bodies whose inhabited interactions play the very same 
problem-transforming roles as our own. 
 
 
4.  The Hybrid Matrix  
 
There is a clear problem for any full Industrial Strength reading of 
the Matrix. Such readings make it hard to understand how Neo can 
(as Morpheus puts it) ‘bend the rules’. If your brain was getting its 
inputs from, and feeding its outputs to, this kind of immersive virtual 
reality set-up, there should be no room to break the laws of physics 
just by willing it so. Worse still, rampant rule-bending seems to 
deprive the world of its ability to function as a boundary condition, 
and this would undermine my attempts to argue for genuine 
embodiment and presence inside the matrix. It is as if you really 
could make the jigsaw puzzle piece fit just by wishing it so, in which 




By contrast, the real dreaming model makes rule-bending easy to 
understand, perhaps along the lines of lucid dreaming mentioned in 
section 2. But this model fails to account for the kinds of preserved 
critical acuity that we do see in the matrix: the fact that Neo’s flying is 
seen by everyone as something remarkable, as proof of superhuman 
prowess, and is not simply accommodated courtesy of dampened 
critical and executive processing. 
 
Certainly, with a bit of ingenuity, we could probably come up with 
patches for each of these models. For example, someone who favors 
the industrial strength model could depict Neo as a kind of 
‘psychological hacker’ whose willpower somehow alters the 
underlying code, bypassing rich and detailed restraints that really do 
apply to the average person. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (in their paper on 
this site) offer a version of this, in which Neo’s belief that a spoon is 
bending forces the system to conform. Similarly, someone who favors 
the ‘real dreaming’ option might argue that the machines somehow 
link all the sleepers into a single web, maintaining the standard 
(critical acuity diminishing) REM sleep chemistry but thus forcing the 
sleepers to dream a single dream.  
 
Between these two extremes, however, lies some of the most 
interesting ground of all, the ground of what I am calling the ‘Hybrid 
Matrix’. On the hybrid model, the matrixers’ world is indeed a kind 
of immersive virtual reality, but one that has been rather lazily 
programmed. Instead of recreating a deep and fully constraining 
physics, we can imagine that the machines’ simulation is patchy, and 
depends on a lot of quick and dirty tricks16. For example, instead of 
running a complete, continuous full simulation of all locations and 
objects, they may only have programmed detail to unfold and update 
where one or more matrixers happen to look (a standard move, in 
fact, in ordinary Virtual Reality simulations). They may also not have 
bothered much about fine-grained continuity. Perhaps minor objects 
can come and go quite freely. On this model, the machines (like 
cinematographers!) just make sure that nothing major, and in 
anyone’s focal attention, behaves strangely. We humans are 
surprisingly oblivious to unexpected scene-changes and non-central 
 18
continuity errors anyway, as a large recent literature on “change 
blindness” clearly demonstrates17. It is almost as if we are built to live 
in a lazily programmed world! In addition, lazy programming, as we 
all know, is also a royal invitation to hacking. The lazily programmed 
Matrix is at once an eminently hackable Matrix, as Neo, Trinity and 
Morpheus know so well. 
 
To further support lazy programming, we might even imagine that 
the machines have tilted the chemical balances in the hosts’ brains 
just enough to make them even more unlikely to attend to much fine 
detail, or to pursue rigorous and sustained environmental 
examinations. Such tilting would not yield genuine chemically-
sleeping brains, but they would not be fully alert brains either. All 
this would just underline the guiding politics of the Matrix, which is 
a politics of awakening from dull, unthinking conformity and thus of 
escape from invisible, corrosive, but surprisingly violable constraints.  
 
Would a lazily programmed Matrix still count as a real world, 
according to the argument of the previous section? I think it would, 
just so long as the lazy program was stable enough, and powerful 
enough, to impose some boundary conditions and cognitively 
exploitable order in most normal circumstances. It would be, as 
David Chalmers has suggested, just like a real world with a rather 
lazy God and a surprisingly patchy ultimate physics! 
 
Which model is correct? Is the Matrix a consensual dream-world, a 
multi-agent immersive virtual reality simulation or a lazily 
programmed hybrid? I do not think we should seek an answer to this 
question. The power, beauty, and philosophical depth of the Matrix 
all derive from its ability to show us our world under many guises. 
At times, it shows us our world as a genuine dream-world, 
dominated by (strangely consensual) delusions. Such a world is 
ultimately unconstraining but hard to fathom, and maximally 
resistant to critical attention. At other times, it shows us our world as 
boundary condition, as a hard-edged arena for rational thought and 
embodied action. At still other times, it shows us a hybrid world, 
poised unsteadily between the two extremes. Just as normal 
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wakefulness comes in many grades, characterized by the shifting 
balance between the aminergic and cholinergic systems, so the movie 
constantly shifts from one state to another, morphing between 
delusional dream and immersive virtual reality. By flipping between, 
and mixing among, these two perspectives it finally reveals our own 
world as a potent cocktail of genuine boundary conditions, delusions, 
and mutual constructions.  
 
This is where we need to end. Ours is a world in which much of what 
we ordinarily think constrains us is not truly binding. But this 
freedom does not reveal our world as a simple dream world, but 
rather as a real world, rich with the possibility of renewal and 
reconfiguration. By refusing to conform to any single interpretation, 
the narrative, structure and filmic texture of the Matrix sequence all 
encode the same message: take nothing for granted, don’t write 
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1 Thanks to David Chalmers, Christopher Grau, and Tyler Waite for 
helpful comments and suggestions.  
 
2  This list is based on the Table 3.1 “Physiological Basis of 
Differences between Waking and Dreaming’ in J. Allan Hobson 
(2001) p.57 
 
3 I do not mean to suggest that the distinction between real dreaming 
and industrial strength ‘deception’ will help us evade skeptical 
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uncertainty. Rather, my concern will be to explore how making this 
distinction affects our view of what the machines are doing, and of 
the moral status of their manipulations. 
 
4 The above paragraph condenses, and slightly oversimplifies, the 
views found in Hobson (2001), Blackmore (2004). See also Roberts, 
Robbins and Weiskrantz (1998) and Siegel (2003). 
 
5 Once more, this is in no way to privilege one system over another 
for effective reason and intelligence, which demonstrably depends on 
the proper temporally evolving balance of the two, but  just to note 
the different contributions made by each. 
 
6 One thing may be said to prime another when exposure to the first 
makes the occurrence of the second more likely. The term is mostly 
used in psychological studies in which unconsciously perceived 
stimuli make subsequent conscious choices faster or incline them in 
one direction rather than another. 
 
7 For more on this, see Siegel (2003). 
 
8 There is an interesting question here concerning what we should 
take to be the brain of an industrial strength matrixer. Is it the brain 
of the human in the machines power grid? Or is it the brain that is 
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specified in the immersive reality simulation itself (e.g. the one we 
would see were we to observe matrix-bound neurosurgery!)? One 
way to proceed is to think of the brain in the grid as the ultimate (and 
unexpected) physical realization of the brain in the simulation (for a 
defense of this line, see Chalmers paper on this site). This is ok if we 
really are dealing with the full strength version, since any practice of 
neurosurgery inside the matrix would need to be synched either to 
real changes in the brains in the grid, or (at the very least) to changes 
in the input and output signals that correspond to those that such 
surgery would have induced.  
 
9 For more on this, and many examples from development and 
robotics, see Clark (1997) 
 
10 See their paper on this site. Their view, like my own and that of 
David Chalmers, is that there is an important sense in which 
industrial strength matrixers really are embodied and coping with a 
wider world. Dreyfus and Dreyfus, however, pursue an interesting 
final twist concerning our ability to (as they put it) ‘open up new 
worlds’. I highly recommend reading both these essays these essays 
in full. 
 
11 From D. Dennettt  (1981) 
 
 23
                                                                                                                                                 
 
12 Technologies of this stripe are by no means inconceivable. Just a 
year or two ago, the neuroscientist Miguel Nicolelis conducted a 
study to understand the way signals from cerebral cortex control the 
motions of a monkey’s limbs.  An Owl Monkey had 96 wires 
implanted into its frontal cortex, feeding signals into a computer.  As 
the monkey’s brain sent signals to move the monkey’s limbs, this 
“neural wire-tap” was used to gather data about the correlations 
between patterns of neural signal and specific motions. The 
correlations were not simple. But the patterns, though buried, were 
there in the signals. Once these mappings were known, the computer 
could then predict the intended movements directly from the neural 
activity.  The computer could then use the neural signal to specify the 
movements of a distant robot arm (an electro-mechanical prosthesis 
in an MIT laboratory six hundred miles distant). The system used a 
haptic interface, part of a multi-sensory Virtual Reality system used 
to touch, feel and manipulate computer generated objects. The 
machines, we can imagine, have simply taken this technology to the 
natural limit, developing advanced neural wiretaps allow the 
matrixers to explore and act upon a common virtual world. For a 
large-scale exploration of these new technologies, and of what it 
ultimately means to be human, see Clark (2003) 
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13 The feeling shifts, however, when Dennett’s body is subsequently 
trapped by a rockslide, entombed far beneath the earth’s surface.  At 
first, Dennett feels tapped beneath the surface.  But then the radio 
links themselves begin to give way, rendering him blind, deaf and 
incapable of feeling.  The shift in point-of-view was immediate;  
 
Whereas an instant before I had been buried alive in 
Oklahoma, now I was disembodied in Houston … 
as the last radio signal between Tulsa and Houston 
died away, had I not changed location from Tulsa to 
Houston at the speed of light? 
Dennett (1981) p.317 
 
14 See Chapter 4 of Dourish (2001). This idea is drawn from 
phenomenology, and has roots in the work of Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty and others. 
 
15 Christopher Grau (personal communication) asks whether such a 
view is too strong, amounting in effect to a simple redefinition of the 
real, rather than a substantial account. But my claim is not that any 
consistently imagined world counts as real (a claim that David 
Chalmers may actually be closer to making). That’s why I stress the 
importance of genuine (not merely imagined) boundary conditions, 
and of the agent actually being able to offload computational work 
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onto the environment. These are not mere matters of what the agent 
thinks they are doing, but matters of fact. My line, roughly, is that to 
perceive a real world is to perceive a  genuinely useable cognitive 
resource. Even a lazily programmed matrix (see section 4) might 
provide for that, for example by allowing people to really find out 
that one jigsaw puzzle piece (simulated) doesn't fit into one space 
(simulated), and by allowing the use of intelligent saccades directed 
at a stable scene (kept stable by real-world physics or good 
simulation) as a problem solving tool. As the amount of lazy 
programming ( and thus instability and unreliability) increases, this 
'signature of the real' gets eroded. All this is the case whether or not 
the agents actually notice anything. It is not, on my account, a matter 
of seeming to use a stable external world as a cognitive resource, but 
of actually doing so. 
 
16 Special thanks to David Chalmers for encouraging me to expand on 
this possibility. 
 
17 For a review, see Simons and Levin (1997) 
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